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This paper examines the performance of the spatial rbitrages carried out between two 
regional markets for wholesale natural gas linked by a pipeline system. We develop a 
new empirical methodology to (i) detect if these markets are integrated, i.e., if all the 
spatial arbitrage opportunities between the two markets are being exploited, and (ii) 
decompose the observed spatial price differences into factors such as transportation costs, 
transportation bottlenecks, and the oligopolistic behavior of the arbitrageurs. Our 
framework incorporates a new test for the presence of market power and it is thus able to 
distinguish between physical and strategic behavior constraints on marginal cost pricing. 
We use the case of the “Interconnector” pipeline linking Belgium and the UK as an 
application. Our empirical findings show that all the arbitrage opportunities between the 
two zones are being exploited but confirm the presence of market power. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, a series of structural and regulatory reforms have been carried out to 
ensure the competitiveness of the European natural gas industry. A major development in this 
restructuring was the emergence of a collection of wholesale markets for natural gas, the “gas hubs”, 
interconnected throughout the pipeline network. Though these hubs were initially developed to cope 
with local network balancing needs, they turned out t  become a source of gas procurement as the 
previously monopolized industry structure gradually became more fragmented (Miriello and Polo, 
2015). Crucially, EU-led reforms also allowed gas arbitrageurs to purchase intermarket transportation 
rights and compete to exploit spatial price differenc s between these interconnected markets.  
These spatial arbitrages are central to ensuring an efficient supply of natural gas, especially in the
EU. Indeed, the policy debates related to the organization of the EU’s internal market for natural gas 
repeatedly underline the importance of spatial arbitrages as a means to prevent balkanization (Vazquez 
et al., 2012). The security of the supply of natural gas is a recurrent source of concern in Europe which 
is predominantly served by a small oligopoly of foreign producers (Abada and Massol, 2011). 
Geographically, each of these producers can be viewed as a dominant player in the adjacent national 
markets it serves (e.g., Russia in Eastern European cou tries, Algeria in Southern Europe). As the 
producers’ operations are located outside the EU jurisdiction, they can exert market power in 
supplying these markets, a situation that may be hard to moderate using the usual EU competition 
arsenal. To overcome that problem, the EU policy strongly promotes the “creation of a single gas 
market” – i.e., the spatial integration of the national wholesale markets – aimed at diluting the 
concentration observed in some countries within a wider economic market.  
Defining and measuring spatial integration, though, is not straightforward. In Stigler and Sherwin 
(1985), two geographical markets for a tradable good are set to be integrated if the spatial price 
difference between these two markets equals the unit transportation cost. However, empirically, 
assessing the spatial integration of wholesale gas m rkets remains a challenging task because price 
spreads could also reflect other factors, including transportation bottlenecks and, more importantly, 
oligopolistic pricing by the arbitrageurs. To overcome this problem, we define integration using the 
equilibrium notion that all spatial arbitrage opportunities between the two markets are being exploited, 
i.e: that price spreads are consistent with the traders’ profit maximization behavior. This notion is 
derived from the theoretical literature on spatial price determination that was pioneered by Enke 
(1951), Samuelson (1952), Takayama and Judge (1971) and Harker (1986). 
This paper develops a new empirical methodology to assess the arbitrages between two regional 
markets for wholesale natural gas linked by a capacity-constrained infrastructure. This methodology is 
designed to (i) detect if these markets are integrad, i.e., if all the spatial arbitrage opportunities are 
being exploited, and (ii) decompose the observed spatial price differences into factors such as 
transportation costs, transportation bottlenecks, and the oligopolistic behavior of the arbitrageurs. Our 
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framework incorporates a test for the presence of market power and is thus able to distinguish between 
physical and strategic constraints to marginal cost pricing. As an application, we use the spatial 
arbitrages in the “Interconnector” pipeline which connects Europe’s two oldest spot markets for 
natural gas: the UK’s National Balancing Point and the Zeebrugge market in Belgium. 
A large amount of empirical research has examined th  degree of spatial integration between 
markets for wholesale natural gas with the help of time-series techniques. These studies typically rely 
on local price data and assess the co-movements of prices at each market location. In these analyses, it 
is typically argued that high degrees of correlation (Doane and Spulber, 1994) and/or co-integration 
between the price series (e.g., De Vany and Walls, 1993; Serletis, 1997; Asche et al., 2002; 
Siliverstovs et al., 2005; Asche et al., 2013) are evidence that the law of one price is being enforced 
through spatial arbitrages.1 These price-based empirical models provide useful insights into how local 
price shocks are transmitted to adjacent markets. However, the methodology used in these studies is of 
little help in assessing the competitive nature of the observed spatial arbitrages, as they fail to deect 
the presence of imperfect competition. Moreover, as suggested by Barrett (1996, 2001), Baulch (1997) 
and McNew and Fackler (1997), these empirical models are unable to account for the pivotal role 
played by both intermarket transfer costs and trade flow considerations.2 
This paper uses, and brings to the field of energy economics for the first time, an alternative 
approach based on the extended parity bounds model (PBM) developed by Barrett and Li (2002). In a 
PBM, arbitrageurs are assumed to be profit-maximizing agents. Using that assumption, intermarket 
price spreads are examined using a “switching regim” specification, which estimates the probability 
of observing each of a series of trade regimes. Sexton et al. (1991), for example, use only price data 
and consider three distinct trade regimes depending on whether the spatial price difference is greater, 
equal or lower than the unit intermarket transportation cost. This modeling approach is now widely 
used in agricultural economics to assess food market integration (Baulch, 1997; Fackler and Goodwin, 
2001; Negassa and Myers, 2007; Cirera and Arndt, 2008; Moser et al., 2009; Zant, 2013). In 
particular, Barrett and Li (2002), our point of departure, make use of trade flow data to further 
distinguish whether trade occurs or not in each of the three regimes. Their direction-specific approach 
allows them to detect any violation of the theoretical equilibrium conditions that all arbitrage 
opportunities between the two markets are being exploited: namely, if trade is observed and the spatial 
                                                 
1 Other time-series analyses include (i) the autoregressive model of pairwise price differentials in Cuddington and Wang 
(2006) to estimate the speed of adjustment toward equilibrium, (ii) the vector error-correction models in Park et al. (2008), 
Brown and Yücel (2008) or Olsen et al. (2015), and (iii) the examinations a time-varying degree of price convergence among 
spot markets with the help of the Kalman Filter approach (King and Cuc, 1996; Neumann et al., 2006; Renou-Maissant, 
2012). 
2 These criticisms emphasize a lack of acquaintance with existing economic models of spatial price determination. Two lines 
of arguments motivate that shortcoming. First, intermarket transfer costs are typically omitted in these early empirical 
studies whereas, in theory, price equalizing arbitrage activities are triggered only when localized shocks result in spatial 
price differences which exceed these intermarket transfer costs (Barrett, 1996, 2001; Baulch, 1997; McNew and Fackler, 
1997). Second, trade flows information play no role in these early empirical studies whereas theory suggests that either 
discontinuities in the trade flows or variations in the directions of these flows can have an impact on he degree of co-
movements among prices at each market location (Barrett and Li, 2002). 
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price difference is lower than the transportation cst or if no trade is observed while having a spatial 
price spread greater than the transportation cost.3 
We introduce two modifications to existing PBMs to be able to apply them to natural gas 
markets. Existing PBMs assume the presence of perfect competition in the spatial arbitrages, which 
may be a realistic assumption in agricultural markets, but not in natural gas markets. So, we introduce, 
for the first time in a PBM, the possibility that arbitrageurs have market power. Second, again becaus 
of the nature of agricultural markets, the role of transportation bottlenecks has so far been neglected. 
But binding (pipeline) capacity constraints are highly likely to occur in the gas industry. So, we 
propose to analyze, for the first time, the role of capacity constraints in spatial price spreads. 
As an application, we examine the spatial arbitrages performed between the two oldest European 
markets for wholesale natural gas in Belgium and the UK. This allows us to present a series of original 
empirical findings that: (i) show that all the arbit age opportunities between the two zones are being 
exploited, but (ii) confirm the presence of market power in the spatial arbitrages. As the detailed 
institutional arrangements created for these two markets have largely shaped the designs of the other 
Continental markets, we believe that these findings provide a valuable contribution to the policy 
debate related to the restructuring of the European m rket for natural gas.  
We believe that this framework can provide useful guidance to a large audience interested in the 
functioning of the restructured natural gas industrie  (e.g., competition authorities, regulators, market 
analysts). It could also inform the modeling choices r tained in the spatial equilibrium models recently 
developed for that industry (cf., Huntington, 2009). In these numerical models, researchers typically 
either posit the existence of competitive spatial arbitrages (e.g., Golombek et al., 1995) or imperfectly 
competitive ones (e.g., Abada et al., 2013).  
Despite the importance of market power concerns in the energy policy debates, the market power 
potentially exerted by natural gas arbitragers has hitherto been little studied. A notable exception is the 
theoretical analysis in Ritz (2014) who highlights the potential role of the LNG exporters' market 
power in the observed price differentials between Asia and Northwest Europe. In an empirical 
analysis, Rupérez Micola and Bunn (2007) apply standard regression techniques to examine the 
relationship between the pipeline capacity utilization (i.e., the ratio of utilized to maximum capacity) 
and the absolute price difference between Belgium and the UK. Their results document the presence of 
market splitting at moderate levels of capacity utilization which, according to the authors, suggests the 
presence of market power inefficiencies. However, nither the direction of the trade flows nor the 
intermarket transfer costs play any role in their analysis. By taking these features into account, our 
                                                 
3 The PBM framework was first proposed by Sexton et al. (1991), drawing on Spiller and Huang (1986). To the best of our 
knowledge, the energy economics literature only provides a handful of studies based on the PBM framework (e.g., Kleit, 
1998, 2001; Bailey, 1998). All of them only use price data, are based on the original work of Spiller and Huang (1986) and 
ignore the developments proposed in Barret and Li (2002). Hence, these earlier models are unable to test whether all 
arbitrage opportunities between the two markets are being exploited. 
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paper confirms the presence of market power, even if all the arbitrage opportunities are being 
exploited, and connects the empirical results to the theoretical literature on spatial price determination. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 details the theoretical 
conditions for spatial equilibrium between two markets linked by a capacity-constrained transportation 
infrastructure. Section 3 presents an adapted empirical methodology to investigate whether these 
conditions hold or not. Then, Section 4 details an application of this methodology to the case of the 
Interconnector UK, a natural gas pipeline connecting he UK to Continental Europe. Finally, the last 
section offers a summary and some concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical background 
This section presents the theoretical conditions for short-run spatial equilibrium between two 
markets connected by a capacity-constrained transportation infrastructure. We make two alternative 
assumptions regarding the gas traders’ behavior: perfect competition and oligopolistic behavior à la 
Cournot. For simplicity, in both cases, the local supply in both markets is assumed to be competitiv.  
We consider two markets i and j  located in different regions that trade a homogeneous 
commodity. At time t , the two markets are connected by a single transportation infrastructure that has 
direction-specific, non-negative finite capacities that can change over time,jitK  from market from j  to 
i  and ijtK  in the opposite direction. During any trading period t , the infrastructure solely allows to 
move the commodity in a given direction, and therefor  the directional capacities de facto verify 
0jit ijtK K× = . The direction of the infrastructure is known at the beginning of each trading period. It 
can vary from one such period to the next but not within a given trading period. This framework is 
consistent with the physical constraints observed in the natural gas industry.4 
Let us, from now on, concentrate on the direction-specific arbitrages that can be performed from 
market j  to market i  at time t . For each region i  at time t , we assume that there is a linear inverse 
demand function: ( )Dit it ip q a b q= −  with 0ita >  and 0ib > .5 We assume that the local industries’ 
aggregate supply functions are linear and upward sloping.6 In each region i  at time t , we let 
                                                 
4 A bidirectional pipeline can only be operated in a given predetermined direction during the normal trding hours of a given 
day. Because of substantial system inertia, the flow direction cannot be changed within the trading hours. Therefore, the 
direction of the infrastructure is typically communicated to traders at the beginning of the trading hours who, in turn, know 
that their arbitrage decisions cannot modify the direction of the infrastructure within the day.  
5 These slope coefficients are not subscripted with the time index and are thus assumed to be constant. In contrast, the 
intercepts of these inverse demand functions are assumed to be time-varying parameters (because of the seasonal variations 
observed in natural gas demand). These assumptions are frequently used in the context of restructured electricity markets 
(e.g., Day and Bunn, 2001). 
6 The use of a linear functional form for the demand  supply curves simplifies computations and is commonly adopted in 
the energy economics literature (e.g., Green, 1999). That said, our main arguments should hold even if demand and supply 
functions were not linear because in the presence of market power, each arbitrageur recognizes that the quantity it supplies 
will affect the prices at both the originating and destination markets. As a result, the price paid andthe price received will 
depend on the quantity supplied, and the resulting gains (spread multiplied by quantity) will be non-liear in the quantity 
supplied. Instead, in the competitive case, the sprad gains would be linear in the quantity transported. 
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( )Sit it it i itp S c d S= + , with 0itc >  and 0id >  and where itS  is the local supply, denote the inverse supply 
function. To avoid corner solutions, we also assume that: (i) in the destination market i , the price 
demanded when the import infrastructure is operated  full capacity is larger than the marginal cost f 
the least-costly local supplier (i.e., it i jit ita b K c− > ), and (ii) in the origin market j , the marginal cost to 
solely supply a flow equal to the infrastructure capacity is lower than the local consumers’ highest 
willingness to pay for that commodity (i.e., jt jt j jita c d K> +  ).  
The trading firms’ unique activity is to perform spatial arbitrages.7 We assume that there are no 
transport lags so that spatial arbitrage can take place within each observation period. The non-negative 
aggregate trade flow from j to i  measured at time t is denoted jitQ . 
When performing a spatial arbitrage from market j  to market i  at time t , a trader incurs the unit 
transfer costs jitT . In addition, that trader must also purchase an appropriate amount of transportation 
rights. A transportation right provides its owner with the right to transfer up to one unit of good from 
market j  to market i  at a given time period t . We let jitξ  denote the market clearing price of a 
transportation right from market j  to market i  at time t . The total number of rights offered at that 
time is jitK .  
a – Case A: Perfectly competitive spatial arbitrages 
In this case, we assume that traders adopt a price-taking behavior at each location and in the 
market for transportation rights. Following the logic of the Enke-Samuelson-Takayama-Judge spatial 
equilibrium model, the traders’ aggregate behavior at time t  can be described using two 
complementarity conditions that together characterize the equilibrium conditions for competitive 
spatial arbitrages: 
Proposition 1: For the equilibrium conditions for perfectly spatial arbitrages to hold at 
time t , we need that the following aggregate complementarity conditions are verified: 
0 jitQ≤ ,  0it jt jit jitP P T ξ− − − ≤  and ( ) 0it jt jit jit jitP P T Qξ− − − = ,  (1) 
0 jitξ≤ ,  jit jitQ K≤   and  ( ) 0jit jit jitQ K ξ− = ,   (2) 
where itP  and jtP  are the market clearing prices in each location, ad jitξ  is the price of a 
transportation right that is the price of capacity (in excess of  jitT ) that ensures that 
demand for transportation services does not exceed supply jitK .  
                                                 
7 Throughout the paper, we follow the convention retained in most of the literature in industrial and energy economics and 
assume that arbitragers are risk-neutral (e.g., Hubbard and Weiner, 1986; Borenstein et al., 2008).  
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The proof of that proposition is detailed in Appendix A. The complementarity condition (1) 
clarifies the value of the traders’ marginal profit to spatial arbitrages. This marginal profit is defin d as 
the difference between the market-clearing price at location i  and the marginal cost which is the sum 
of three elements: the price at location j , the marginal transfer cost jitT  and jitξ  the price of a 
transportation right. The complementarity condition (2) ensures that the price jitξ  is equal to zero 
whenever the aggregate demand for transportation right jitQ  is lower than the supply (i.e., whenever 
the transportation capacity constraint jit jitQ K≤  is slack), and that jitξ  is positive when the constraint 
jit jitQ K≤  is binding. In case of a zero price for transportation right (i.e., 0jitξ = ), the complementarity 
condition (1) ensures: (i) that there is no trade from market j  to market i  (i.e., 0jitQ = ) when the 
marginal profit to spatial arbitrage is negative, and (ii) that the spatial price spread is equal to the 
marginal transfer cost jitT  when trade occurs and it is not constrained by the infrastructure’s capacity 
(i.e., 0 jit jitQ K< < ). In case of a binding capacity constraint (i.e., jit jitQ K= ), the complementary 
condition (1) ensures that the spatial price difference is larger than the marginal transfer cost jitT . In 
this case, there exists a scarcity rent ( )jit jit it jt jit jitK P P T Kξ = − − .   
b – Case B: Oligopolistic spatial arbitrages 
We now assume that there are a total of G  gas traders that behave à la Cournot in the local 
markets. As in Harker (1986), each trader thus knows how the prices in each region react to the 
quantities supplied and demanded thorough the intermarket infrastructure but rather takes the price of 
transportation right as given. The following propositi n indicates that the traders’ aggregate behavior 
at time t  can also be described using two complementarity conditi ns.  
Proposition 2: For the equilibrium conditions for oligopolistic spatial arbitrages to hold 
at time t , we need that the following aggregate complementarity conditions are verified: 
0 jitQ≤ ,  0
j j jiti i
it jt jit jit
i i j j
d b Qd b
P P T
Gb d b d
ξ
 
− − − + − ≤  + + 
 and 
 0j j jiti iit jt jit jit jit
i i j j
d b Qd b
P P T Q
Gb d b d
ξ
  
 − − − + − =   + +  
,     (3) 
0 jitξ≤ ,  jit jitQ K≤  and  ( ) 0jit jit jitQ K ξ− = ,       (4) 
where itP  and jtP  are the local market clearing prices. 
The proof of that proposition is detailed in Appendix B. The economic interpretation of these 
conditions is similar to those detailed for the case of competitive arbitrages except that the traders’ 
aggregate behavior at time t  now accounts for the players’ ability to exert market power in both 
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 represents the marginal loss of revenue from getting a lower 
price for each of the units the player is selling there. The trader’s marginal cost includes three distinct 












represents the marginal cost increase from getting a higher price for each of the units the player is 
purchasing (i.e., the effect of the players’ oligops nistic behavior in market j ); (ii) the marginal 
transfer cost jitT , and (iii) the price of a transportation right jitξ . 
It is instructive to compare these aggregate conditions with the ones obtained in case of 
competitive arbitrage. One may remark that, in the ev nt of oligopolistic arbitrages, the spatial price 
differential in (3) is always larger than the marginal transfer cost jitT  when trade is observed. 
Moreover, from an empirical perspective, it is interesting to note that the spread between the spatial 
price differential and the marginal transfer cost is proportional to the aggregate trade flow when trade 
is observed and the congestion constraint is slack. We shall come back to this point in the sequel. For 
the moment, we simply highlight that this reflects the traders’ ability to exert market power by 
restricting intermarket trade to generate some oligopolistic rents. 
3. Methodology 
This section presents the methodology used in this manuscript. We first adapt the existing PBM 
framework to take into account the role of both pipeline capacity constraints and market power. 
Subsequently, we detail the empirical specification.  
3.1 An adapted parity bounds model 
We now define seven mutually exclusive trade regimes and relate them to the theoretical 
conditions for spatial equilibrium detailed in the previous section. In addition to the six trade regimes 
considered in the PBM proposed in Barrett and Li (2002), we introduce a new one that takes into 
account the case of pipeline congestion. Moreover, for each of these trade regimes, we distinguish 
between the cases of perfectly competitive and oligopolistic spatial arbitrages.  
From an empirical perspective, it is important to highlight that the price of a transportation right 
jitξ  is seldom publicly available as its formation chiefly results from over the counter transactions. In 
the sequel, we thus follow the convention in Barrett and Li (2002) and define the marginal rents to 
spatial arbitrage in case of competitive arbitrages as the difference between the spatial price spread 
and the marginal transfer cost jitT . For ease of exposition, we also define the marginl rents to spatial 
arbitrage in case of oligopolistic arbitrages as the difference between the marginal revenue obtained in 
market i  (i.e., including the term representing the traders’ ability to exert oligopolistic market power 
9 
there) and the sum of the marginal purchase cost in market j  (i.e., including the term representing the 
traders’ ability to exert oligopsonistic market power there) and the marginal transfer cost jitT . Hence, 
both definitions do not include the price of a transportation right and thus differs from the marginal 
profit to spatial arbitrages defined above. 
As shown in Table 1, marginal rents to spatial arbitrage and trade flow considerations can be 
combined to define a taxonomy of trade regimes governing the arbitrages from market j  to market i . 
Regarding marginal rents to spatial arbitrage, three basic states can be defined depending on their 
value: zero, strictly positive, or strictly negative. Regarding trade flows, two basic states can be 
identified depending on whether a positive trade flow is observed or not. Following Barrett and Li 
(2002), each of these six regimes is labeled I to VI, where odd numbers are used for regimes with 
strictly positive trade flows and even numbers for those without trade. 
Table 1. The trade regimes in each direction 
 Trade is observed: No trade is observed: 
 0 jit jitQ K< ≤  0jitQ =  






positive marginal rents to 
spatial arbitrage 
Regime IIIa iff jit jitQ K<  
aIII
λ  












In regimes I and II, the marginal rents to spatial arbitrage are equal to 0. As shown in the 
previous section, depending on the assumption posited for the behavior of the trading sector, one of 
the following conditions is binding:  
Case A: Competitive arbitrages Case B: Oligopolistic arbitrages 
0it jt jitP P T− − =     (5) 0
j j jiti i
it jt jit
i i j j
d b Qd b
P P T
Gb d b d
 
− − − + =  + + 
 (6) 
In case of price-taking behavior (Case A), the spatial price differential is equal to the marginal transfer 
cost. In case of oligopolistic arbitrages (Case B), the possibility to exert market power results in a 
spatial price differential that exceeds the marginal transfer cost and the difference between the two is 
proportional to the observed trade flow. In Case A (respectively B), each of the two regimes verifies 
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the complementarity slackness condition (1) (respectiv ly  (3)) when there is no congestion cost (i.e., 
0jitξ = ). Therefore, both regimes are consistent with the conditions for a spatial equilibrium. 
In regimes III and IV, the marginal rents to spatial arbitrage from j  to i  are strictly positive:  
Case A: Competitive arbitrages Case B: Oligopolistic arbitrages 
0it jt jitP P T− − >     (7) 0
j j jiti i
it jt jit
i i j j
d b Qd b
P P T
Gb d b d
 
− − − + >  + + 
 (8) 
In both of these regimes, markets are separated and there are unseized opportunities for profitable 
spatial arbitrage. Still, in case of positive trade (regime III), the observed insufficient arbitrages might 
result from the capacity-constrained nature of the transportation infrastructure. Indeed, the 
complementarity conditions detailed in the preceding section indicate that, in case of a binding 
capacity constraint (i.e., jit jitQ K= ), observing a strictly positive value for the marginal rents to 
arbitrage is consistent with the conditions for a short-run spatial equilibrium. In contrast, the joint 
observation of strictly positive marginal rents to arbitrages and a slackening in the infrastructure’s 
capacity constraint violates the conditions for a sp tial equilibrium. Thus, we propose a modification 
to the original model and further decompose regime III into two mutually exclusive regimes labeled 
III a and IIIb. In regime IIIa, the observed trade flows verify 0 jit jitQ K< <  whereas a binding capacity 
constraint (i.e., jit jitQ K= ) is observed in regime IIIb. Therefore, the latter regime, but not the former, is 
consistent with the conditions for a spatial equilibrium. 
In regimes V and VI, the marginal rents to arbitrage from j  to i  are strictly negative:  
Case A: Competitive arbitrages Case B: Oligopolistic arbitrages 
0it jt jitP P T− − <     (9) 0
j j jiti i
it jt jit
i i j j
d b Qd b
P P T
Gb d b d
 
− − − + <  + + 
 (10) 
In both regimes, there are no profitable arbitrage opportunities. In regime VI, trade is not occurring 
and the observed local prices correspond to autarky p ices. This regime is consistent with the 
conditions for a spatial equilibrium. In contrast, regime V indicates that trade is occurring despite 
negative marginal profits which is not consistent with equilibrium conditions.  
In sum, having introduced a further distinction between regimes IIIa and IIIb, a total of seven 
regimes are thus considered in our analysis. The estimated probability to observe regime r  is denoted 
rλ . Spatial equilibrium conditions hold with probability ( )bI II III VIλ λ λ λ+ + +  and the estimated 
probability to observe disequilibrium is ( )
aIII IV V
λ λ λ+ + . 
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3.2 Empirical specification 
We now detail the empirical specification aimed at estimating the probabilities of being in each 
regime using a data set of N  observations for the local market-clearing prices, the marginal transfer 
cost, the trade flow, and the available transportati n capacity. 
In case of oligopolistic arbitrages, the slope coeffici nts for the local inverse demand and supply 
functions are unlikely to be readily available to the modeler. So, we introduce γ an unknown 
parameter to be estimated that will be interpreted as 
1 j ji i
i i j j
d bd b
G b d b d
 
+  + + 
 the sum of the two local 
coefficients determined by the slopes of the inverse supply and inverse demand functions. So, we 
expect the estimated value for γ  to be non-negative. 
Denoting jit it jt jitR P P T≡ − −  the series that represents the difference between th  spatial price 
spread and the unit transfer cost, the marginal rents to arbitrage in each of the three distinct cases 
(zero, positive and negative) are modeled using the following switching regression model (Sexton et 
al., 1991; Baulch, 1997; Barrett and Li, 2002): 
Case A: Competitive arbitrages Case B: Oligopolistic arbitrages 
Regimes I & II: 
   jit jitR ε=    (11) 
Regimes IIIa, IIIb & IV: 
   jit jit jitR ε µ= +    (12) 
Regimes V & VI: 
   jit jit jitR ε υ= −    (13) 
 Regimes I & II: 
   jit jit jitR Q γ ε= +       (14) 
 Regimes IIIa, IIIb & IV: 
    jit jit jit jitR Q γ ε µ= + +           (15) 
 Regimes V & VI: 
    jit jit jit jitR Q γ ε υ= + −             (16) 
 
where: γ  is an unbounded parameter to be estimated; jitε  is a random error that is assumed to be i.i.d. 
normally distributed with a zero mean and variance 2εσ ; and jitµ  and jitυ  are i.i.d. random samples 
from zero-centered normal distributions truncated above at 0 with respective variance parameters 2µσ  
and 2υσ .   
In applications, measurement and sampling error are likely to occur with any data to which this 
model might be applied. An extended specification may be justified to control for these issues. In the 
sequel, a term 'ji t jiXα β+  – where: jiα  is the regime-invariant mean parameter, tX  is a vector of 
exogenous factors including a time trend and a list of seasonal dummy variables and jiβ  is the 
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associated regime-invariant vector of parameters – is systematically implemented in the equations to 
capture the time-invariant, the trend and the seasonal components of possible measurement errors.  
The specifications used to model the cases of competitive and oligopolistic spatial arbitrages 
differ only in the markup term jitQ γ . Thus, a statistical test of the null hypothesis 0γ =  (e.g., a 
likelihood ratio test) can be conducted to test the null hypothesis of perfectly competitive spatial 
arbitrages. For the sake of brevity, only the unrestricted model based on equations (14), (15), and (16) 
is detailed hereafter.  
Denoting λ  the vector of the probabilities to observe the seven regimes,
 ( ), , , , ,ji ji ε µ υθ α β γ σ σ σ≡  
the parameter vector to be estimated and 'jit jit ji t ji jitR X Qπ α β γ≡ − − −  the random variable that gives the 
marginal profit from spatial arbitrage at time t , the joint density function for the observation at time t  
is the mixture distribution: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )





jit jit jit I jit jit jit III jit III jit jit V jit jit
II IV VI
jit II jit jit IV jit jit VI jit jit
f A f B B f f
A f f f
π λ θ λ π θ λ λ π θ λ π θ
λ π θ λ π θ λ π θ
 ≡ + − + +
 
 + − + +
 
 (17) 
where: jitA  is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if trade is observed and zero otherwise; jitB
is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the transportation infrastructure is congested and zero 
otherwise; ( )Ijit jitf π θ  and ( )IIjit jitf π θ  are normal density functions; ( )IIIjit jitf π θ  and ( )IVjit jitf π θ  
(respectively ( )Vjit jitf π θ  and ( )VIjit jitf π θ ) are the density functions derived in Weinstein (1964) for the 
sum of a normal random variable and a centered-normal random variable truncated above 
(respectively below) at 0.  
The likelihood function for a sample of observations { }, ,jit jit jitR Q K  is: 






L fλ θ π λ θ
=
≡ ∏         (18) 
The model can be estimated by maximizing the logarithm of the likelihood function with respect 
to regime probabilities and model parameters subject to the constraints that the regime probabilities 
sum to one and that each of these probabilities lies in the unit interval. 
As most existing PBM models, the specification described so far is based on a static formulation 
whereby shocks are posited to be serially independent and the variance parameters are held constant 
throughout the entire observation period. As these assumptions can be too restrictive in applications 
based on daily data, we also use an enriched dynamic specification including a correction for serial 
correlation and GARCH-type time-varying variance, as detailed in Appendix C. 
This specification differs from that of Barrett and Li (2002) in three ways. First, we show how a 
parity bound model can be used to test the null hypothesis of competitive spatial arbitrages. Second, 
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contrary to Barrett and Li, the two markets under scrutiny are connected by a capacity-constrained 
transportation infrastructure. So, a seventh regime labeled IIIb is introduced to account for the 
explanatory role played by infrastructure congestion issues in the observation of positive marginal 
profits to spatial arbitrage. Lastly, the specification is extended to a dynamic formulation. 
4. Application 
4.1 Background 
This application focuses on the so-called Interconnector (hereafter abbreviated to IUK), a bi-
directional natural gas pipeline system connecting the UK National Transportation System (using the 
Bacton Terminal) to Zeebrugge (Belgium). This infrast ucture allows spatial arbitrages between 
Europe’s two oldest spot markets for natural gas: (i) the UK’s NBP, which allows counterparties to 
trade a standardized lot of natural gas piped via the UK National Transmission System with a delivery 
point at the so-called National Balancing Point (NBP); and (ii) the Zeebrugge local market in Belgium, 
which is labeled ZEE. 
We consider the period covering October 1, 2003, to October 5, 2006. This starting date has been 
chosen to omit the number of partial closures of the IUK that happened during the summer of 2003 
(Futyan, 2006). This terminal date corresponds to the opening of the Langeled infrastructure, a 
pipeline system that together with already existing offshore pipelines, allowed Norwegian gas 
producers to perform spatial arbitrages between the UK and the Continent, thereby offering an 
alternative to the IUK. During that period, the IUK pipeline was thus the unique infrastructure linking 
the UK and Continental natural gas markets. From an industrial organization perspective, both 
countries experienced stable market structures during this period which is posterior to the deep 
restructuring process of the UK gas sector (Wright, 2006) and precedes the merger between Gaz de 
France and Suez that strongly impacted the Belgian m rket after November 2006 (Argentesi et al., 
2017). In addition, that period corresponds to a steady institutional environment with unchanged 
access rules for both the IUK and the adjacent natio l pipeline systems. These features make the IUK 
case an attractive experiment to assess the spatial price arbitrages that can be performed in a 
deregulated natural gas industry.   
4.2 Data 
We use daily transaction price data for day-ahead wholesale natural gas traded during working 
days as published by Platt’s, a price-reporting servic . For each working day (i.e., Monday to Friday), 
they reflect the price range of a standardized quantity of natural gas to be delivered at a constant flow 
rate throughout the next working day after assessment (Platt’s, 2012). All prices are denominated in 
€/MWh. Given the extremely limited liquidity of within-day markets, we follow the usual convention 
and refer to these day-ahead prices as “spot” since they provide traders with a final opportunity to 
trade gas out of a forward position before physical delivery.  
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The unit transfer costs jitT  are direction-specific and are derived from the ful sed by the IUK 
operator to power its compressor equipment since this cost is billed to the traders. According to the 
pipeline operator, fuel gas consumption amounts to 0.8% of the quantity of gas transported when 
natural gas is piped from the UK to Belgium, and to 0.26% of the quantity of gas transported in the 
other direction. This fuel cost is evaluated using the price of natural gas in the exporting market. 
Regarding trade flow data, the wish may be to use an aggregate variable gathering all the 
transportation nominations communicated at the end of any working day for delivery during the next 
working day. Unfortunately, these data are confidential. So, this study uses a proxy: a historical flow 
series representing the physical daily flow of natur l gas, measured in GWh/day, that transited through 
the IUK as reported on the pipeline operator’s websit . Thus, we proceed under the assumption that 
the physical gas flow measured during a given working day represents an unbiased estimator of the 
aggregate transportation nominations decided during the previous working day (at the time when trade 
occurs in the corresponding day-ahead market).8 
According to the Interconnector operator, the nominal transportation capacity from the UK to 
Belgium remained unchanged during the entire sample period. In the other direction, the installation of 
some compressor equipment in Zeebrugge on November 8, 2005, increased the transportation 
capacity. Unfortunately, information related to the available daily transportation capacities remains 
unavailable. So, we follow Rupérez Micola and Bunn (2007) and consider the historical maximum 
values of the trade flows. The historical maxima were: 624.63 GWh/day from the UK to Belgium, and 
310.24 GWh/d prior to November 8, 2005, (respectively 511.80 GWh/d after that date) in the other 
direction. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the daily flow capacity of a point-to-point natural gas 
pipeline is a time-varying parameter that depends on a series of exogenous factors (e.g., the operating 
pressures of the adjacent national pipeline systems, the flow temperature, the chemical composition of 
the natural gas (Yépez, 2008; Massol, 2011). Hence, the historical maximum daily flow cannot 
necessarily be attained. We proceed by assuming that congestion is likely to be a source of concern 
when the observed capacity utilization ratio (measured against the historically maximum) exceeds 
80%.9 Hereafter, this threshold is used to distinguish regimes IIIa and IIIb.  
The data set has been modified in two ways. First, both the Belgium and UK markets are closed 
on national bank holidays. To account for differences in the national calendars, all the observations 
related to a bank holiday in either Belgium or the UK have been disregarded in the subsequent 
analyses. Second, we excluded observations made on dates during which the Interconnector service 
was unavailable due to planned maintenance (these dates are documented on the IUK’s website). As a 
                                                 
8 On a given working day, pipeline users are offered the possibility to revise the transportation service requested at the end of 
the previous working day. This is the so-called within-day re-nominations. Yet, for the pipeline operator, these within-day re-
nominations generate a significant extra operation costs. As a result, the detailed pricing rules adopted by the pipeline 
operator have been explicitly designed to render thse within-day re-nominations extremely costly. So, users have a strong 
incentive to contract their real transportation needs for day d+1 at the end of day d (i.e., before th close of the day ahead 
market). Therefore, we proceed assuming that these within-day re-nominations can be neglected. 
9 Regarding the threshold level, we also tested two other threshold levels: 85% and 90% but the estimation results were very 
similar to the ones obtained using the 80% level. 
15 
result, we assembled time series data containing 723 daily observations on prices, compressor fuel 
costs, and trade flows in each direction.   
Lastly, the constant mean parameter jiα is supplemented by a vector of observable exogenous 
variables in order to control for the possible impact of a time-varying measurement bias in the price 
and transfer cost data. The list of control variables includes: a time trend (the associated parameter to 
be estimated is denoted timeβ ), eleven monthly dummy variables and four daily variables to control for 
seasonal effects, and two dummy variables: 2004 2005D −  that takes the value 1 during the period covering 









). Each of these period corresponds to a “standard g s year” during which the regulated Entry-
Exit tariff system used by the UK National Transportation System is kept unchanged.  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
An examination of trade data indicates that out of these 723 observations, 369 correspond to net 
positive exports to Belgium (of which 26 correspond to a congested infrastructure), 341 to net imports 
to the UK (of which 46 correspond to a congested infrastructure) and 13 to zero trade. 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the two series jitR  (i.e., the difference between 
the spatial price spread and the unit transfer cost) both for the entire sample and for a restricted sample 
that omits the two exceptional episodes. The distribu ional properties of these series show some signs 
of non-normality as a very large leptokurtosis is observed in both cases. The estimated first-order 
autocorrelation coefficients reveal evidence of serial correlation. This finding is in favor of a dynamic 
specification able to correct for serial correlation.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the marginal rent to spatial arbitrage 
 NBP ZEER →  ZEE NBPR →  
 Mean -0.232 0.044 
 Median -0.100 -0.051 
 Maximum 7.484 25.189 
 Minimum -25.543 -8.096 
 Standard Deviation 1.581 1.557 
 Skewness -7.394 7.396 
 Kurtosis 108.946 112.664 
 K-S test 0.104 0.261 






 Observations 723 723 
Note: K-S is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the null hypothesis of normality. Asterisks indicate  
significance at the 0.01***  level. 
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Figure 1 provides plots of these two series jitR  and the measured pipeline flow from Bacton (UK) 
to Zeebrugge (Belgium). A visual inspection of these plots suggests that the series jitR exhibit two 
very large spikes on January 23, 2004 and between Fbruary 18 and February 24, 2005. According to 
market commentators, a conjunction of exceptional factors posed dramatic upward pressure on the UK 
NBP prices in these two occasions. On Friday 23 January 2004, an outage affected the withdrawal 
operations conducted at the Rough storage site during a particularly cold weather episode. As this 
storage site accounts for about 70% of the UK's gas storage capacity, this outage prompted a “dash for 
gas” that resulted in exuberantly high prices. On February 18th, 2005, a sudden and colder-than-
anticipated weather episode began in the UK creating a eed for immediate injections of LNG into the 
UK national transportation system at a moment when t re was no available LNG cargoes that could 
had been redirected to the UK. During these spikes, the marginal rents to arbitrage from the UK to 
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Belgium (respectively from the continent to the UK) were obviously very negative (respectively 
positive). 
Given their magnitude, one could wonder whether the presence of these spikes is consistent with 
the modeling assumptions retained for the truncated ran om variables jitµ  and jitυ . In particular, it has 
to be verified whether the use of a time-invariant variance parameter 2υσ  for the arbitrages performed 
from the UK to Belgium ( 2µσ  for the opposite direction) holds. To this purpose, we introduce 
23 Jan 2004D  and 18 24 Feb 2005D − , two dummy variables that take the value one during their respective 
episode and zero elsewhere, and allow the standard deviation of the half-normal random variable jitυ  
(respectively jitµ ) to be of the form 23 Jan 2004 18 24  Feb 200523 Jan 2004 18 24 Feb 2005D DD Dυσ ζ ζ − −+ +  (respectively 
23 Jan 2004 18 24 Feb 200523 Jan 2004 18 24 Feb 2005D D
D Dµσ ζ ζ − −+ + ) where 23 Jan 2004Dζ  and 18 24  Feb 2005Dζ −  are parameters to be 
estimated, for the arbitrages performed from the UK to Belgium (respectively from Belgium to UK). 
4.4 Estimation and empirical results 
a – Estimation procedure 
The estimation procedure involves the constrained maxi ization of a non-trivial log-likelihood 
function. This is a non-linear, non-convex, constrained optimization problem that has to be solved 
numerically using hill-climbing procedures.10  
To obtain a feasible starting point, we first consider the simplest possible static specification (i.e., 
omitting the time trend, the dummy variables, the flow variable, the autocorrelation, the GARCH 
parameters and the spike parameters). The converged solution for this restricted specification is then 
used as a feasible starting point for the unrestricted models. The optimization problem at hand has the 
potential for local maxima, which is a source of con ern because the outcome of a non-linear 
programming solver may depend on the location of the starting point. To address this problem, the 
first solution is compared to the ones obtained with a sample of 500 starting points uniformly drawn 
over a range of possible starting values. The converged solution that provides the highest likelihood 
value is systematically stored. 
b – Empirical results 
We first consider the simplest static specification of the PBM and successively estimate two 
versions of it: the simple one presented in Section 3 which is hereafter labeled Model I.a; and an 
extended version, labeled Model I.b, where the dummy variables corresponding to the observed spikes 
are introduced in the standard deviations of the respective truncated random variables (i.e., υ  for the 
arbitrages performed from Belgium to the UK and µ  in the opposite direction). 
                                                 
10 All the estimates reported in this paper have been obtained using an iterative procedure that performs 20 iterations using 
the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) algorithm followed by 20 iterations using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno 
(BFGS) one, and then a switch back to DFP for 20 iterations, and so forth. 
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The estimation results are presented in the first two columns of Table 3 for the arbitrages 
performed from the UK to Belgium, and of Table 4 for the arbitrages performed in the opposite 
direction. These tables detail the estimates obtained for: the market power coefficient (γ ), the regime 
probabilities (λ ’s), the measurement bias parameters (α , timeβ , 2004 2005Dβ − , 2005 2006Dβ − ), the standard 
deviation parameters for the normal and truncated normal distributions ( εσ , µσ , υσ , 23 Jan 2004Dζ , 
18 24  Feb 2005D
ζ
−
) and a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis 0γ = . For concision, the seasonal 
parameters included in the mean equation (i.e., the coefficients of the daily and monthly dummy 
variables) are not reported. 
From these estimation results, four main lines of findings can be highlighted. First, the estimated 
values for the coefficient γ  are positive, as expected. These estimates are highly significant in both 
directions, which reveals the presence of imperfectly competitive arbitrages across the Channel. A 
further confirmation is provided by the likelihood ratio tests: the null hypothesis of competitive 
arbitrages is firmly rejected in both directions. So, we cannot reject the assumption of imperfectly 
competitive arbitrages during that period. This finding is consistent with the results in Rupérez-Micola 
and Bunn (2007).  
Second, the high estimates obtained for Iλ  and IIλ  in both directions reveal that the observed 
spatial price difference is predominantly explained by the sum of the unobserved marginal transaction 
costs and the markup term. These very high values result in a very high probability of observing a  
spatial market equilibrium. Following Barrett and Li (2002), the probability of spatial market 
equilibrium conditions holding is in the range defin d by the minimum and the maximum values of the 
direction-specific sums ( )
bI II III VI
λ λ λ λ+ + + , that is (91.635, 92.340) for Model I.a and (89.085, 
91.184) for Model I.b.  
Third, the estimated probabilities 
aIII
λ , though small, are positive. Infrastructure congestion issues 
that are directly related to the Interconnector pipeline cannot be invoked to explain the presence of 
these strictly positive marginal profits to spatial arbitrage. These observed trade barriers could, for 
example, be due to pipeline congestion in the adjacent systems. In contrast, the probabilities 
bIII
λ  to 
jointly observe infrastructure congestion and strictly positive marginal profits to spatial arbitrage 
regime are either zero or very low. These estimated values are consistent with the analysts’ consensus 
summarized in Futyan (2006) on: (i) the oversized nature of the IUK’s transportation capacity when 
natural gas is flowing to the Continent and (ii) the likely capacity-constrained nature of the IUK in the 
opposite direction (before the November 2005 capacity increase).  
Lastly, one can compare the magnitude of the log-likelihoods of these two static models. In both 
directions, the null hypothesis 
23 Jan 2004 18 24 Feb 2005
0D Dζ ζ −= =  is firmly rejected by a standard likelihood ratio 
test which confirms the need to allow for a dedicated modeling of the spikes. 
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 Table 3. Estimation results for natural gas trade from the UK to Belgium 
 MODEL I (static) MODEL II (dynamic) 
 Model I.a Model I.b Model II.a Model II.b 
Mean parameters     
α  -0.6429*** -0.5679*** -0.3173*** -0.2321* 



















γ  0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 
ρ  ______ ______ 0.3592*** 0.4857*** 
Second moment parameters     





 ______ ______ 
ϖ  ______ ______ 0.0186*** 0.0118 
δ  ______ ______ 0.9227*** 0.9406*** 
ϕ  ______ ______ 0.0161 0.0120 
   Regimes IIIa, IIIb & IV         
µσ  2.3515*** 2.2738*** 2.1237*** 1.8522*** 
  Regimes V & VI
 
    




______ 23.0378 ______ 27.3104
***
 





 ______ 2.2908 
Probabilities (in %)         
Iλ  47.2321*** 46.0367*** 48.0096*** 46.0932*** 
IIλ  32.1778*** 27.2187*** 41.9937*** 36.7620*** 
aIII
λ  2.9901*** 3.3179*** 3.1748*** 4.4911*** 
bIII
λ  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
IVλ  3.8551*** 3.8155*** 2.7430*** 3.8501*** 
Vλ  0.8150** 1.6822*** 0.0002 0.7116 
VIλ  12.9298*** 17.9290*** 4.0787*** 8.0920*** 
Log likelihood  -1070.2260 -1006.8927 -967.7803 -934.2613 
Akaike Information Criterion 2200.452 2077.7854 2001.5606 1938.5226 
LR tests      
H0: 0γ =  143.638  (0.000) 163.851  (0.000) 122.202  (0.000) 165.614  (0.000) 
H0: 0ρ δ ϕ= = =  ______ ______ 204.891  (0.000) 145.263  (0.000) 
Observations  723 723 723 723 
Note: Estimates for the monthly and daily dummies are not reported for brevity. Significance tests are based on asymptotic 
standard errors that have been computed using the Hessian matrix of the log-likelihood function. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 0.10*, 0.05**  and 0.01***  levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are the p-values of the χ2 statistics of 
the likelihood ratio (LR) tests.  
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Table 4. Estimation results for natural gas trade from Belgium to the UK 
 MODEL I (static) MODEL II (dynamic) 
 Model I.a Model I.b Model II.a Model II.b 
Mean parameters     
α  -0.2305*** -0.2513*** -0.0092 -0.0300 

















γ  0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 
ρ  ______ ______ 0.3738*** 0.3770*** 
Second moment parameters         





 ______ ______ 
ϖ  ______ ______ 0.0199*** 0.0178*** 
δ  ______ ______ 0.9292*** 0.9643*** 
ϕ  ______ ______ 0.0042 0.0000 
   Regimes IIIa, IIIb & IV         




______ 22.5982 ______ 22.3679 





 ______ 5.0316 
  Regimes V & VI
 
        
υσ  2.5157*** 2.3382*** 2.3246*** 2.1070*** 
Probabilities (in %)         
Iλ  37.8438*** 35.6264*** 41.6279*** 40.9389*** 
IIλ  48.9237*** 47.6156*** 49.9429*** 48.5970*** 
aIII
λ  2.8774*** 4.3503*** 1.9708*** 2.7345*** 
bIII
λ  1.9321*** 2.1687*** 0.5832** 0.5764* 
IVλ  0.9762** 1.5448** 0.9646*** 1.7067*** 
Vλ  4.5118*** 5.0199*** 2.7215*** 2.8430*** 
VIλ  2.9350*** 3.6743*** 2.1890*** 2.6036*** 
Log likelihood  -1085.9403 -1057.9039 -956.6066 -925.5461 
Akaike Information Criterion 2231.8806 2179.8078 1979.2132 1921.0922 
LR tests      
H0: 0γ =  146.538  (0.000) 134.329  (0.000) 112.599  (0.000) 96.105  (0.000) 
H0: 0ρ δ ϕ= = =  ______ ______ 258.667  (0.000) 264.716  (0.000) 
Observations  723 723 723 723 
Note: Estimates for the monthly and daily dummies are not reported for brevity. Significance tests are based on asymptotic 
standard errors that have been computed using the Hessian matrix of the log-likelihood function. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 0.10*, 0.05**  and 0.01***  levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are the p-values of the χ2 statistics of 
the likelihood ratio (LR) tests.  
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As such a static specification is de facto poorly adapted to capture the dynamic properties of daily 
data, we also consider the enriched dynamic specification presented in Appendix C that includes a 
correction for first-order serial correlation and a GARCH(1,1) effect. Again, two versions are 
successively considered. In Model II.a, the standard deviations of the half-normal random variables 
are time-invariant whereas Model II.b includes the dummy variables 23 Jan 2004D  and 18 24 Feb 2005D −  to 
control for the effects of these exceptional episodes. The estimation results are presented in the third 
and fourth columns of Table 3 and Table 4. Compared to the static model, these two columns also 
report the estimates of the autocorrelation parameter (ρ ), the GARCH parameters (ϖ , δ , ϕ ) used to 
model the heteroscedasticity of the residuals in regim s I and II, and a likelihood ratio test of the null 
hypothesis of a static model (i.e., 0ρ δ ϕ= = = ).  
From the estimation results, we observe that the estimated autocorrelation coefficients ρ and the 
estimated ARCH coefficients δ  are highly significant in both directions which justifies the use of a 
dynamic specification. A confirmation is provided by the likelihood ratio tests that show that the null 
hypothesis of a static model (i.e., 0ρ δ ϕ= = = ) is firmly rejected for both Model II.a and Model II.b in 
both directions.  
Regarding the interpretation, it should be noted that t e estimation results obtained with the 
dynamic specification are consistent with the findings obtained with the static one. Again, the 
estimates document the imperfect nature of the competition among spatial arbitragers because the 
market power coefficient γ  is positive and highly significant in both Model II.a and II.b in both 
directions. Moreover, the likelihood ratio tests again firmly reject the null hypothesis of competitive 
arbitrages in both directions. Regarding the regime probabilities, the estimates obtained for Iλ  and IIλ  
remain the largest in both directions. The probability of spatial market equilibrium conditions holding 
is higher than 90% as the range defined by the minimum and the maximum values of the direction-
specific sums ( )
bI II III VI
λ λ λ λ+ + +  are (94.082, 94.343) for Model II.a and (90.947, 92.716) for Model 
II.b). 
5. Concluding remarks 
In Europe, the question of how to detect market power in the spatial arbitrages observed in a 
restructured natural gas industry is one of the keychallenges that regulators and competition 
authorities have to address. The objective of this paper is to offer an empirical methodology which is 
able to test for the presence of perfect competition in these spatial arbitrages. Our approach explicitly 
builds upon the literature dedicated to natural gas m rkets integration and extends it by focusing on the 
relationship between the observed spatial price diff rence and the intermarket trade flows. 
A case study focusing on the IUK pipeline during the period 2003–2006 provided us with an 
opportunity to obtain a series of original findings. The estimated probability of spatial market 
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equilibrium conditions holding is very high, suggesting high degrees of wholesale natural gas market 
integration, consistent with previous research on IUK price co-movements (Neumann et al., 2006). 
But, the empirical evidence also suggests the presenc  of imperfect competition in the observed spatial 
arbitrages, consistent with the price-data results in Rupérez-Micola and Bunn (2007). Although our 
discussion is centered on this specific infrastructure, it should be clear these results imply that some 
care is needed when interpreting the high degree of co-movements which is typically documented in 
the empirical studies conducted on European spatial market price data. Though these co-movements 
can be interpreted as objective signs of market intgration, they do not necessarily reveal the existence 
of a perfectly competitive internal market.  
 The institutional arrangements implemented in the UK to govern the functioning of the natural 
gas market have influenced the design of the other EU gas markets (Heather, 2010; Hallack and 
Vazquez, 2013). Future research will thus examine wh ther or not market equilibrium conditions hold 
in less mature continental markets. Such research could be useful for informing the current EU 
regulatory debates related to the functioning of the internal market for natural gas. From a 
methodological perspective, such research could also explore the possibility to opt for a more general 
class of model (e.g., a hidden Markov specification) that could, for example, allow for a possibly 
changing behaviour of the spatial arbitrageurs (e.g., to represent agents that may adopt a competitive 
behaviour in some observations and exert market power in others).  
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Appendix A – Perfectly competitive spatial arbitrag es 
 This Appendix details the formal proof of Proposition 1. We let: itD  and jtD  denote the 
quantities demanded at time t  in each region, ( ) ( )0
itD D
i it itB D p q dq= ∫  and ( ) ( )0
jtD D
j jt jtB D p q dq= ∫  denote 
the gross consumer surplus in each region at that time, and ( ) ( )
0
itS S
i it itC S p q dq= ∫  and 
( ) ( )
0
jtS S
j jt jtC S p q dq= ∫  denote the total cost incurred by the producers in each region. By construction, 
we have: ( ) ( )' Di it it itB D p D= ; ( ) ( )' Dj jt jt jtB D p D= ; ( ) ( )' Si it it itC S p S=  and ( ) ( )
' S
j jt jt jtC S p S= . 
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Proof of Proposition 1: Following Takayama and Judge (1971), we define the net quasi-welfare 
function for the two regions as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , jit i it j jt i it j jt jit jitW D S Q B D B D C S C S T Q= + − − − ,     (A.1) 
this form is also known as the net social payoff which maximizes the sum of producers’ and 
consumers’ surplus after deducting for transfer costs (Samuelson, 1952). The competitive market 
equilibrium is the solution of the following optimization problem (Takayama and Judge, 1971): 
, , jitD S Q
Max
 
( ), , jitW D S Q  
(A.2) 
s.t. 0it it jitD S Q− − ≤  (A.3) 
 0jt jit jtD Q S+ − ≤  (A.4) 
 
jit jitQ K≤  (A.5) 
 0itD ≥ , 0jtD ≥ , 0itS ≥ , 0jtS ≥ , 0jitQ ≥ . (A.6) 
where the objective is to maximize the net social payoff subject to a set of linear constraints. Here, th  
constraint (A.3) states that the quantity consumed in market i  is less than or equal to the sum of the 
local supply and the quantity shipped into that region; the constraint (A.4) states that the sum of the 
quantity consumed in market j and the quantity shipped from that region is less than or equal to the 
local supply; and (A.5) is the capacity constraint related to the transportation infrastructure. We let: 
itφ , jtφ  and jitξ  denote the dual variables associated with the constraints (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) 
respectively. The dual variables itφ  and jtφ  can be interpreted as the market clearing prices in the 
two markets and the dual variable jitξ  can be interpreted as the market clearing price in the market 
for transportation rights. Hereafter, we let L denote the Lagrangian for this optimization problem.  
As the objective function is quadratic and strictly concave with respect to both D  and S , this 
problem has a unique solution ( )* * * * * * * *, , , , , , ,it jt it jt jit it jt jitD D S S Q φ φ ξ  that verifies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 






























































jit jitQ K≤ , 0jitξ ≥  and 0jit jit jitQ K ξ − =  . (A.14) 
First, we examine the equilibrium at market i . We reason by contradiction and assume that, at 
market equilibrium, the quantity supplied by the local producers is zero: i.e., * 0itS = . Condition (A.9) 
imposes ( )* 0Sit itpφ ≤  i.e., *it itcφ ≤ . Condition (A.7) indicates that ( )* *Dit it itp D φ≤  and thus *it i it ita b D c− ≤  
must hold. As * 0itS = , condition (A.12) indicates that 
* *
it jitD Q≤  and condition (A.14) indicates that 
*
jit jitQ K≤ . As 0ib > , we must have it i jit ita b K c− ≤  which contradicts the assumption it i jit ita b K c− >  
(cf., Section 2) and thus invalidates the assumption * 0itS = . Hence, the equilibrium is such that the 
local supply is positive * 0itS >  which proves (cf. condition (A.9)) that the market price 
*
itφ  at the 
destination market is equal to the regional supply rice, i.e. ( )* *Sit it itp Sφ = . As * 0itφ > , the condition 
(A.12) is such that * * *it it jitD S Q= + . As 
* 0itS >  and 
* 0jitQ ≥  (cf., (A.11)), the quantity demanded at market 
i  is positive: * 0itD >  and the condition (A.7) reveals that, at market i , the market price 
*
itφ  verifies 
( )* *Dit it itp Dφ = . Hence, the market price *itφ  is equal to both ( )*Dit itp D  the price demanded by the local 
consumers and ( )*Sit itp S  the regional supply price. We let itP  denote that market clearing price. 
Second, we examine the equilibrium at market j . Again, we reason by contradiction and assume 
that, at market equilibrium, the quantity demanded by the local consumers is zero: i.e., * 0jtD = . 
Condition (A.8) imposes ( ) *0Djt jtp φ≤  that is: *jt jtaφ ≥ . As * 0jtφ > , condition (A.13) indicates that 
* *
jt jitS Q=  and thus ( ) ( )* *S Sjt jt jt jitp S p Q= . As *jit jitQ K≤ , we have ( ) ( )*S Sjt jt jt jitp S p K≤ . From condition 
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(A.10), we thus have ( )* Sjt jt jitp Kφ ≤  which indicates that the condition jt it i jita c d K≤ +  must hold which 
contradicts the assumption jt jt j jita c d K> +  (cf., Section 2). So, the equilibrium is such that t e local 
demand must be positive * 0jtD >  which suggests that the market price 
*
jtφ  at the destination market is 
equal to ( )* *Djt jt jtp Dφ =  the price demanded there (cf., condition (A.8)). As * 0jtD >  and * 0jitQ ≥ , the 
condition (A.13) reveal that * * *jt jit jtD Q S+ ≤  which indicates that 
* 0jtS >  and thus, using condition 
(A.10), we obtain ( )* *Sjt jt jtp Sφ = . So, at market j , the market price *jtφ  is equal to both ( )*Dij jtp D  the 
price demanded by the local consumers and ( )*Sit itp S  the regional supply price. We let jtP  denote that 
market clearing price. 
Substituting jtP  and jtP  for 
*
itφ  and 
*
jtφ  in condition (A.11), one can readily identify the 
complementarity conditions (1) and (2) in the conditions (A.11) and (A.14) that must hold at 
equilibrium.           Q.E.D. 
Appendix B – Oligopolistic spatial arbitrages  
In this Appendix, we present the technical developments needed to prove Proposition 2. We 
examine the collective behavior of the G  gas traders. We proceed as in Gabriel et al. (2013) and 
define a series of conditions that together characte ize the spatial equilibrium at time t : first, the 
collection of G  mathematical programming problems describing the traders’ individual behavior, and 
second, a complementarity condition similar to (2) that ties the traders’ individual optimization 
problems and describes the market clearing conditio in the market for transportation rights.11  
First, each trader { }1,...,g G∈  is a profit maximizing agent that solves the following 
optimization problem:  
g
jitq
Max  ( )( ) ( )( )D g g g g D g g g g git it jit jit jit jit jt jt jit jit jit jit jit jit ji tp S q q q q p S q q q q T qξ− − − − + + + − + − − − −   (B.1) 
s.t. 0gjitq ≥  
 
where the non-negative decision variable gjitq is the flow traded by g  from market j  to market i  at 
time t , gjitq
−  is a short notation for the sum of the flows decidd by the other traders, ( ).Ditp  and ( ).Djtp  
are the local inverse demand functions. The objectiv  function (B.1) describes the total profit obtained 
by trader g . In that objective function, the unit revenue obtained in the destination market i is 
( )( )D g g g git it jit jit jit jitp S q q q q− −+ + + . The total unit cost is the sum of: ( )( )D g g g gjt jt jit jit jit jitp S q q q q− −+ − −  the 
                                                 
11 From a technical perspective, this problem is an instance of what is known in the operations research community as a 
Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (which is also named a social equilibrium problem in economics). We ref r to the 
survey in Facchinei ·and Kanzow (2010) for a comprehensive presentation of that type of problems and to Ruiz et al. (2014) 
for an overview of applications in the context of energy markets. 
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purchasing price in j , jitT  the unit transfer cost, and jitξ  the price of a transportation right. The 
following reasoning is useful to further define the relations ( ).itS  and ( ).jtS  that characterize how, in 






=∑  as a short notation for the aggregate flow of gas tr nsferred by all the traders, we can 
remark that: at market equilibrium at time t , the local demanded price at the destination market i  
(respectively the origin market j ) is ( )Dit it jitp S Q+  (respectively ( )Djt jt jitp S Q− ) and that price must be 
equal to the price obtained with the local inverse supply function ( )Sit itp S  (respectively ( )Sjt jtp S ). 
Therefore, the functions ( ).itS  and ( ).jtS  are:12  
( ) it it iit jit jit
i i i i
a c b
S Q Q




,  and ( ) jt jt jjt jit jit
j j j j
a c b
S Q Q




.   (B.2) 
Second, the market clearing condition at the market for transportation rights is given by the 






=∑  the aggregate demand for transportation rights is lower that the supply (i.e., 
whenever the transportation capacity constraint is slack) and that jitξ  is positive when supply falls 
short of demand (i.e, when this constraint is binding): 




















∑ ,   (B.3) 
Replacing the relations (B.2) in the objective functions (B.1), deriving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions of the traders’ optimization problems and using itP  and jtP  as a short notations for the local 
prices (i.e.: ( )( )Dit it it jit jitP p S Q Q= +  and ( )( )Djt jt jt jit jitP p S Q Q= − ), we obtain the following set of 
complementarity conditions that together characterize the equilibrium conditions for oligopolistic 
spatial arbitrages at time t :
0 gjitq≤ ,  0
j j gi i
it jt jit jit jit
i i j j
d bd b
P P T q
b d b d
ξ
 
− − − + − ≤  + + 
  and 
 0j j g gi iit jt jit jit jit jit
i i j j
d bd b
P P T q q
b d b d
ξ
  
 − − − + − =   + +  
, { }1,...,g G∀ ∈ ,    (B.4) 
                                                 
12 Recall that we assume that the condition it i jit ita b K c− >  is verified. As jit jitQ K≤ , the local supply in the destination 
market i  in equation (B.2) is positive. Similarly, we also assume that jt jt j jita c d K> + . Hence, the local supply in the 
origin market j  in equation (B.2) is such that the amount consumed in the origin market (i.e., the difference between local 
supplies and exports ( )jt jit jitS Q Q− ) is positive. 
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∑ ,   (B.5) 
The economic interpretation of these conditions is similar to those detailed for the case of 
competitive arbitrages except that the traders’ margin l profits to spatial arbitrage are now modified to 
account for the players’ ability to exert market power in both markets. The marginal revenue obtained 














 represents the marginal 
loss of revenue from getting a lower price for each of the units the player is selling there. The trader’s 














 represents the marginal cost increase from getting a higher price for 
each of the units the player is purchasing (i.e., the effect of the players’ oligopsonistic behavior in 
market j ); (ii) the marginal transfer cost jitT , and (iii) the price of a transportation right jitξ .  
Lemma: There exists a unique vector of individual decision  *gjitq  and a unique price 
*
jitξ  
that verifies the equilibrium conditions (B.4) and (B.5). 
Proof: The conditions (B.4) and (B.5) together define the linear complementarity problem LCP 






=  − 
 is a real matrix where B  is the all-ones row matrix of size 1 G×  and 
( )j ji i G G
i i j j
d bd b
A I J
b d b d
 
= + +  + + 
 where GI  the identity matrix of size G  and GJ  the all-ones 
square matrix of size G ; and 
T
jt jt jt jtit it it it
jt j it i jt j it i jit
j j i i j j i i
a c a ca c a c
m a b a b a b a b K
b d b d b d b d
    − −− −= − − + − − +       + + + +     
⋯ . Let 





j jT i i
i j
ii i j j
j i
d bd b
z Mz z z




   = +   + +    
∑  and ( ) ( )
21 1 1
2 2
1 , 1 1
2 2
G G G
i i j i i
i i j i i
j i




 + = +  
 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . Hence, 
M  is positive definite. The Theorem 3.1.6 in Cottle et al., (2009, p. 141) indicates that, if M is 
positive definite, there exists a unique solution t the LCP (m,M).    Q.E.D. 
From an empirical perspective, the experience gained with restructured natural gas markets 
indicates that the individual decisions gjitq  are seldom publicly available whereas the aggregate tr de 
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flow jitQ  are. As in the case of competitive arbitrage, one may wonder whether there exists aggregate 
complementarity conditions that must hold in case of an equilibrium. This is precisely the aim of the 
following proposition which is presented in Section 2.b. 
Proposition 2: If the following aggregate complementarity conditions: 
0 jitQ≤ ,  0
j j jiti i
it jt jit jit
i i j j
d b Qd b
P P T
Gb d b d
ξ
 
− − − + − ≤  + + 
 and 
 0j j jiti iit jt jit jit jit
i i j j
d b Qd b
P P T Q
Gb d b d
ξ
  
 − − − + − =   + +  
,     (B.6) 
0 jitξ≤ ,  jit jitQ K≤  and  ( ) 0jit jit jitQ K ξ− = .       (B.7) 
where itP  and jtP  are the local market clearing prices, do not hold at time t , the 
equilibrium conditions (B.4) and (B.5) for oligopolistic spatial arbitrages are not verified 
at that time. 
Proof: We reason by contradiction and assume that the equilibri m conditions (B.4) and (B.5) are 
verified and, using the lemma above, we let ( )* 1 * * *,..., ,Gjit jit jitz q q ξ=  denote the unique vector of 
decision variables that verifies these conditions. To begin with, we are going to prove that *z verifies: 
either  * 0gjitq =  for any { }1,...,g G∈ , or * 0gjitq >  for any { }1,...,g G∈ . Let us assume that *z  is 
such that there jointly exists at least one trader g  with * 0gjitq >  and at least one trader 'g  with 
' * 0gjitq = . According to the equilibrium conditions (B.4), the marginal profits of these players are: 
Trader g :   * * * * 0j j gi iit jt jit jit jit
i i j j
d bd b
P P T q
b d b d
ξ
 
− − − + − =  + + 
,
   
   (B.8)
 
Trader 'g :   * * * 0it jt jit jitP P T ξ− − − ≤ ,         (B.9) 
where ( )( )* * *Dit it it jit jitP p S Q Q= +  and ( )( )* * *Djt jt jt jit jitP p S Q Q= − . Subtracting (B.8) from (B.9), we obtain 
* 0j j gi i jit
i i j j
d bd b
q
b d b d
 
+ ≤  + + 
 which is a contradiction because we have assumed that *gjitq , id , jd , ib , and 
jb are all positive numbers. Hence, 
*z  has to be such that: either * 0gjitq =  for any { }1,...,g G∈ , or 
* 0gjitq >  for any { }1,...,g G∈ .  
Using a similar argument, we can also prove that, if he equilibrium is such that * 0gjitq >  for any 
{ }1,...,g G∈ , we must have * *g gjit jitq Q G=  for every trader { }1,...,g G∈ . Let us assume that *z  is 
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such that there exists two traders g  and 'g  with * ' * 0g gjit jitq q≥ > , the conditions (B.4) for these two 
traders are such that:  
Trader g :   * * * * 0j j gi iit jt jit jit jit
i i j j
d bd b
P P T q
b d b d
ξ
 
− − − + − =  + + 
,
   
   (B.10)
 
Trader 'g :   * * '* * 0j j gi iit jt jit jit jit
i i j j
d bd b
P P T q
b d b d
ξ
 
− − − + − =  + + 
.      (B.11)
 
Subtracting (B.10) from (B.11), we obtain the equation ( )'* * 0j j g gi i jit jit
i i j j
d bd b
q q
b d b d
 
+ − =  + +   
 that can 
only be verified if  * ' *g gjit jitq q= . As such a reasoning is valid for every pair of traders, we obtain 
* *g g
jit jitq Q G=  for every trader { }1,...,g G∈ . As the condition * *g gjit jitq Q G=  for every trader 
{ }1,...,g G∈  also holds when the aggregate output is equal to 0, we can simply replace *gjitq  by 
*g
jitQ G  in the equilibrium conditions (B.4) and (B.5) to prove that if these conditions hold so do the 
aggregate complementarity conditions (B.6) and (B.7).     Q.E.D. 
Appendix C – A dynamic specification 
The specification in Section 3.2 has a static nature. This technical Appendix outlines how it can 
be extended to model the dynamics of the inter-period linkages that may exist in commodity markets. 
Section C.1. recalls how the analysis in Kleit (2001) can be adapted to correct for serial correlation. 
Section C.2. explains how this approach can also be adapted to model a possibly time-varying 
variance for the residual in regimes I and II. 
C.1 – Correcting for autocorrelation 
Serial correlation due to both supply shocks and speculative storage activity is commonly 
observed in the empirical studies dedicated to commdity prices (Deaton and Laroque, 1996).13 As the 
presence of unmodeled autocorrelation can result in inefficient estimates, the presence of serial 
correlation has to be appropriately corrected for.14 Interestingly, Kleit (2001) details a relevant strategy 
to overcome this limitation and adjust for the possible presence of serial correlation in our error term 
jitε . One has to keep in mind that the exact value ( )1ji tε −  cannot be directly observed. However, one can 
                                                 
13 In the application discussed in this paper, two arguments motivate the presence of autocorrelation. First, a pipeline system 
can be described as a slow-moving transportation infrastructure because a couple of hours are needed to move a given 
molecule of methane from one market to the other. Scond, the operation of a natural gas pipeline system creates a 
temporary energy storage (the so-called line-pack buffer). As a result, daily observations are likely to jointly represent the 
outcome of decisions taken both today and yesterday.   
14 Barrett and Li (2002, footnote 3) discussed the serial correlation issue and claimed that the Cochrane-Orcutt method 
could be used to correct for serial correlation. However, the distribution of the observed residuals is dramatically modified 
from one observation to the next in case of a regim switch. Therefore, one may question the validity of a Cochrane-Orcutt 
approach. 
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consider the expected value of ( )1ji tε − , given the evidence provided by the previous observation, which 
results in the modified specification: 
Regimes I & II:  ( ) ( )( )' 1 1Ejit ji t ji jit ji jitji t ji tR X Qα β γ ρ ε η ε− −− − − − =    (C.1) 
Regimes IIIa, IIIb & IV:  ( ) ( )( )' 1 1Ejit ji t ji jit ji jit jitji t ji tR X Qα β γ ρ ε η ε µ− −− − − − = +   (C.2) 
Regimes V & VI:  ( ) ( )( )' 1 1Ejit ji t ji jit ji jit jitji t ji tR X Qα β γ ρ ε η ε υ− −− − − − = −   (C.3) 
where: jiρ  is an autocorrelation coefficient such that 1 1jiρ− < < ; ( )1ji tη −  is the observed lagged 
residual, that is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 2 2Ejiji t ji t ji t ji tη π ρ ε η− − − −≡ − ; and ( ) ( )( )1 1E ji t ji tε η− −  represents the expected value 
of ( )1ji tε −  given evidence provided by the observed lagged resi ual.  
The expected value ( ) ( )( )1 1E ji t ji tε η− −  can be computed as follows. Given the observed value of the 
lagged residual ( )1ji tη −  and the parameter vector ( )1 , jiθ θ ρ≡ , the probability ( )( )1 1 11P P ,rt t ji tr η θ− − −≡  that 
the residual observed at time 1t −  was generated by regime r  is (Kiefer, 1980; Spiller and Wood, 
1988, p.889–90): 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
11 1
1




r ji t ji tr
t VI
III k






λ λ η θ λ η θ
− −
−





.     (C.4) 
The expected value ( ) ( )( )1 1E ji t ji tε η− −  can be constructed from the observed residual ( )1ji tη −  by: (i) 
subtracting ( )E µ  the expected value of the one-sided random variable jitµ  weighted by the 
probability to observe the regimes IIIa, IIb or IV; and, (ii) adding ( )E υ  the expected value of the non-
negative half-normal random variable jitυ  weighted by the probability to observe the regimes V or 
VI,15 that is:  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11 1 1E P +P +P E P P Ea bIII III IV V VIt t t t tji t ji t ji tε η η µ υ− − − − −− − −    = − + +   .    (C.5) 
                                                 
15 Denoting φ  the density function of the standard normal distribut on and Φ  its cumulative distribution function, these 
expected values are: ( ) ( ) ( )( )E 0 1 0µµ σ φ≡ − Φ and ( ) ( ) ( )( )E 0 1 0υυ σ φ≡ − Φ . 
35 
The construction of ( ) ( )( )1 1E ji t ji tε η− −  can be nested within the likelihood specification above. So, 
the estimation proceeds again from a maximization of the log-likelihood function with respect to the 
regime probabilities λ  and the parameters 1θ subject to the preceding constraints and to 1 1jiρ− < < .
16  
C.2 – An adapted GARCH specification 
Regimes I and II model the cases of zero marginal profit to spatial arbitrage. In these regimes, the 
random variable representing the marginal profit to spatial arbitrage is assumed to be equal to the 
stochastic error term jitε  which has the same finite variance 2εσ  for all observations. Yet, one may 
question the relevance of this homoscedastic assumption as a large empirical literature has 
documented the tendency of commodity prices to exhibit time-varying volatilities. Accordingly, the 
spatial price differential (and thus the marginal rents to spatial arbitrage) is likely to show signs of 
heteroscedasticity. Inspired by the strategy proposed in Kleit (2001) to correct for serial correlation, it 
is also possible to design a modified specification whereby the variance of the marginal rents to spatial 
arbitrage observed in regimes I and II is allowed to vary over time.  
For the purpose of capturing the dynamics of uncertainty, a Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model (Bollers v, 1986) represents an attractive approach 
that has been widely applied to model commodity markets. Given the time series jitR   and jitQ  defined 
above, a GARCH(1,1) specification can be written as follows: 
Regimes I & II:  ( ) ( )( )' 1 1Ejit ji t ji jit ji jitji t ji tR X Qα β γ ρ ε η ε− −− − − − =    (C.6) 
Regimes IIIa, IIIb & IV:  ( ) ( )( )' 1 1Ejit ji t ji jit ji jit jitji t ji tR X Qα β γ ρ ε η ε µ− −− − − − = +   (C.7) 
Regimes V & VI:  ( ) ( )( )' 1 1Ejit ji t ji jit ji jit jitji t ji tR X Qα β γ ρ ε η ε υ− −− − − − = −   (C.8) 
jit jit jith eε =           (C.9) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
2 2
1 1 1Ejit ji ji jiji t ji t ji th hϖ δ ε η ϕ− − − = + +          (C.10) 
where: (C.6), (C.7) and (C.8) are the mean equations; (C.10) is the conditional variance equation; 
(C.9) relates the random error jitε  to the standardized residual jite  which is assumed to be an i.i.d. 
standard normal random variable; and  jiϖ , jiδ  and jiϕ  are the usual, non-negative, GARCH(1,1) 
parameters. 
                                                 
16 Regarding the particular case of the first observation, an arbitrary value has to be taken for ( )0 0E ji jiε η  because 0jiη  
cannot be observed. In this paper, the initial value ( )0 0E ji jiε η  is taken as equal to zero (that is, the conditional mean of 
jitε  given ( )1ji tε − ). 
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Compared to the usual GARCH specification, equation (C.10) involves the use of the squared 
expected value ( ) ( )( )
2
1 1E ji t ji tε η− −     in spite of the true value ( )
2
1ji tε −  which cannot be observed in this 
regime switching model. Again, the construction of the expected value ( ) ( )( )1 1E ji t ji tε η− −  is based on the 
following reasoning: given the observed value ( )1ji tη − , the values of the parameters ( )2 1, , ,ji ji jiθ θ ϖ δ ϕ≡  
and ( )
2
2ji th − , it is possible to evaluate the probabilities 1P
r
t −  and thus ( ) ( )( )1 1E ji t ji tε η− −  using  
(C.5).   
